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The views expressed in this paper are only those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Belgian Ministry of Defence or 
the Royal Higher Institute for Defence. 
Introduction 
In response to the Chicago Summit and following the difficulties that have arisen over the growing 
importance of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), it was decided at the 
European Council of 13 and 14 December 2012 that the 19-20 December summit would be devoted to 
the European security and defence. Three clusters were identified by President Van Rompuy for further 
discussion: increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP, enhancing the development of 
defence capabilities and strengthening Europe’s defence industry. What can one expect from the 
December summit? What level of ambition will be proposed? What initiatives will be taken? The 
declared intention for the end of 2013 is to “review progress achieved in pursuing these goals, assess the 
situation and, on the basis of recommendations by its President, provide guidance, including by setting 
priorities and timelines, to ensure the effectiveness of EU efforts aimed at meeting Europe’s security 
responsibilities”. 
These questions are crucial in view of the “pessimistic” environment in which the CSDP, this sectoral 
policy at the service of the EU, seems to have come to a standstill and to be held back by organisational 
burden, while some member states are showing reluctance to improve its functioning, its resources and 
its ambitions. Other factors account for this need to take stock of the situation and to open up new 
avenues. On the one hand, defence issues have not been on the agenda for five years. On the other 
hand, the economic and banking crisis has adverse effects on defence economics and the Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB). Besides, the European Council met several times between late 
2012 and the autumn of this year to discuss other issues, which makes it possible for the December 
summit to focus on this particular topic (except for urgent matters linked to current events). Finally, the 
Treaty of Lisbon lets the Council play a role in defining the political direction in defence matters, which it 
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has allowed itself to do, under the influence of some countries keen on moving forward with regard to 
the CSDP. As a matter of fact, a window of opportunity does exist, as it was the case in December 2008 
with the Franco-British Summit held in Saint-Malo, although it is not known whether the December 
meeting will “bring forth a mouse”, will be just another frenzy quickly fading away and resulting in the 
lowest common denominator or, on the contrary, will create the conditions for awareness, leading to 
future “strategic” progress and enabling the CSDP to come to maturity.  
Preparations 
 
Two institutions published an official document written on the basis of the mandate described in the 
conclusions of the December 2012 summit: the Commission1 and the European Defence Agency (EDA)2. 
These official documents have been the subject of analyses and diplomatic discussions between 
member states as well as with, according to their competences, the European Union Military Staff 
(EUMS) and different European services and agencies. A draft was prepared by Herman Van Rompuy’s 
cabinet (in consultation with the member states), before being forwarded to the ambassadors and 
foreign ministers in order to take their views and comments into account and to reduce the bracketed 
parts, i.e. the national divergences, as much as possible. The meetings of defence ministers in September 
and of foreign ministers (“Gymnich”) also provided the opportunity to debate the different positions. 
The president of the European Council asked this autumn that the Foreign Affairs/Defence Council 
presents conclusions on the first two points of the mandate (CSDP and capacities, cf. table page 5). 
Besides, Mr Van Rompuy asked the Lithuanian Presidency to provide him, through the Competitiveness 
Council which is to meet on 2 December, with its conclusions about the third part (defence industry). 
However, EU foreign affairs and defence ministers chose to go beyond their mandate as they have been 
preparing a conclusion about all three sections since 4 November.  
Yet, the formal meeting of EU defence ministers held on 18 November 2013 sought to answer the 
unresolved issues and to discuss the final conclusions, but differences of opinion made it necessary to 
return to the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), with a likely adoption during an 
Education Council to be held on 25 November! By then, most of the conclusions of the December 2013 
defence summit will be finalised.  
In addition to this preliminary negotiations process, which is all the more necessary since the duration of 
the Council is fairly short3, a great many4 documents, reports, opinions and other focus papers have 
been written, which analyse and put forward recommendations on the chosen themes but also beyond. 
This includes reactions in the media by some political and military authorities5 working within European 
institutions, but also reports, opinions, conclusions and recommendations from the EUISS6, the 
European Parliament7, the inter-parliamentary conference8 on CSDP, the European Economic and Social 
Committee9, national parliaments10, lobby organisations11, research centres and other think tanks12, 
political groups13, but also directly from some member states14. This also covers publications in special 
issues of journals and conferences organised in order to enrich the debate of December as well as 





The three “schools” 
 
In the light of the various proposals and recommendations, three major schools of thought can be 
identified, yet with some overlaps and duplications as some initiatives also include opinions about the 
general set of themes of other “movements”.  
The first school of thought is the “doctrinaire” one. Doctrinarians put forward the drafting of an EU 
Security and Defence White Paper, of which the relevance has frequently been highlighted, although it 
has never been officially taken into account up until now16. Among them are several research institutes17 
as well as the Kangaroo group, the European’s People Party (EPP) and some European Parliament 
proceedings. In the same context, we can also mention those who suggest launching a strategic 
reflection to redesign the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 and revised in 2008, as well as 
those who wish to come to a defence union on the long run.  
The second school of though is represented by the “institutional players”. Their idea is to reform EU’s 
organisational structures in the framework of its CSDP. They also include those who want to foster the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, set up a EU civil-military 
headquarter with separate chains of command, further integrate civilian and military staffs and organise 
Defence Council meetings on a more regular basis. Some of these actors suggest clarifying the EU’s 
mutual defence and solidarity clauses and improving the links between the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), the various DGs of the Commission and the member states. Several “groups” (EPP) 
advocate a stronger support to EDA and to the rules related to the internal market for defence as well as 
the necessity to include defence in the EU framework programme for research and innovation (Horizon 
2020), the rapprochement between the Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) and 
EDA and a better use of the Commission, ESA and EDA to meet CSDP civil-military goals. Finally, the 
notion of strong European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance can only materialise with political and 
institutional progress on the issue of Cyprus.  
As for the third school of thought, that of the “pragmatists”, it proposes structural and operational 
reforms with the aim of enhancing the credibility of capabilities. The (sometimes competing) official 
documents of the Commission and EDA belongs to this category. Other suggestions also fit into this 
“practical” vision, i.e. that of establishing a sound European Technological and Industrial Base and 
creating stand-by European forces under EU command, as well as some proposals made by defence 
ministers, including Belgian Defence Minister Pieter De Crem, on the use of Battlegroups and the 
application of enhanced cooperation to some countries. The ideas put forward by the Eurodefence 
group or the Franco-German proposals of the summer 2013 over the finalisation of the European 
maritime security strategy, the global observation capability, synergies for dual-use capabilities and the 
suppression of economic compensations also fall in this category. 
Lines of action 
 
On the basis of these various visions corresponding to different degrees of realism, we can foresee 
several lines of action based on different levels of ambition.  
The lines of action wished by the “ultra-Europeans” (EPP documents, think tanks) ambitiously cover the 
more relevant elements of the different schools. They will strive to capitalise on the opportunity offered 
by the December Council to build a more developed CSDP in political, strategic as well as capability 
terms. The primary objective will be to implement all the points relating to CSDP contained in the 
various articles of the Treaty of Lisbon and to launch new ambitious initiatives as from 2014. Their goal is 
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also to foster EU autonomy by developing a strategic culture. In this context, it is not impossible that the 
EU could prepare a timetable for a revised European Security Strategy focusing on the security priorities 
in its neighbourhood and in Africa. Here too the repeated call for a new Eurobarometer survey on 
defence after the last one in 2000 (on the initiative of Belgium) could finally be heard.  
 
The lines of action which are likely to be adopted and which can be reasonably expected will lie on 
concrete elements in terms of capability sharing corresponding to “the level of solidarity desired and/or 
accepted by the Heads of State and Government”18. In the same spirit, a reflection is needed on the 
critical capabilities that the EU should have (cyber defence, communication, air-to-air refuelling, 
transport aircraft, hospital ships, drones, etc.). Taking the Commission proposals into account would also 
be a sign of openness, as much as the application of the principle of reality, i.e. getting money where it 
can be found in large quantities. The objective is to make better use of the financial resources (which will 
not increase) through capability pooling and sharing19. The seed fund in view of financing missions and 
operations will probably be adopted.  
Concrete and non-ideological input could also come from bilateral or multilateral initiatives of some 
member states which have been preparing for the summit: Franco-German20; Franco-British; Weimar; 
Weimar + (Franco-German-Italian-Spanish-Polish); Višegrad +; Benelux… Some aspects could be 
emphasised: support of CSDP to border management, the enhanced cooperation laid down in the Treaty 
of Lisbon (Article 44), but also the priority given to the neighbourhood (review of priorities) and the 
consideration given to necessary rapid-response capabilities with the revised concept of the 
Battlegroups (including as training instrument to the benefit of the forces of regional organisations). A 
rendezvous clause on defence could be adopted without too much trouble, while the timetable would 
remain the European Council’s responsibility. Yet a progress report of the High Representative would be 
due in the spring of 2015. 
 
As for the most pessimistic lines of action, they could be based, at worst, on the hypothesis of the 
suppression of the euro, which would in turn lead to the end of the CSDP or, at best, on the hypothesis 
of short-sightedness, without a real take-off of the CSDP and with a smokescreen of rhetoric. In this 
context, the Atlantic Alliance would become the reference by granting itself more competences in 
security matters. Some defence difficulties related to the issue of competitiveness and offsets (DTIB) 
could also appear at the summit as well as perverse effects of Article 346 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which could significantly weaken the relevance of the 
arguments of the European Commission.  
In all three cases, the comprehensive approach will be put forward, even if the concept, in contrast with 
its wording, does not in the least resolve the strategic questions and the sovereignty and risk-taking 
issues.  
Despite the many papers written by think thanks, which, admittedly, were examined by institutions and 
governments, the publications which are mainly taken into account revolve around the Commission, EDA 
and national interests. In this regard, the tensions between London and Warsaw regarding the DTIB at 
the Foreign Affairs/Defence Council in November are particularly telling. The problem stems from the 
culture shock and the power play between the Commission and EDA, with the states waiting for the right 
time to come up with their own agendas.  
Finally, it should be noted that in the document of the European Commission, it is stated that “Defence is 
still at the heart of national sovereignty” and that “decisions on military capabilities remain with 
Member States”. Between an opportunity to be seized and the renationalisation of defence against the 
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backdrop of the economic crisis, solutions as well as dead ends called “inward-looking sovereignty” and 
“renationalisation of security and defence” could be found. Clearly, political impetus remains key and 
December 2013 could be a strategic opportunity that European states cannot afford to miss, but there 





Table: Extract of the recommendations of December 2012 
§23. The European Council invites the High Representative, notably through the European External Action Service and the 
European Defence Agency, as well as the Commission, all acting in accordance with their respective responsibilities and 
cooperating closely as required, to develop further proposals and actions to strengthen CSDP and improve the availability of 
the required civilian and military capabilities, and to report on such initiatives, at the latest by September 2013, with a view 
to the December 2013 European Council. Member States will be closely involved throughout this process. 
§24 To that end, the European Council underlines i.a. the following issues:  
 
 Increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP by  
− further developing the comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and stabilisation, including 
by developing the ability to respond to emerging security challenges;  
− strengthening the EU’s ability to deploy the right civilian and military capabilities and personnel rapidly and effectively 
on the whole spectrum of crisis management action.  
Enhance the development of defence capabilities by 
− identifying current redundancies and capabilities shortfalls and prioritising future requirements for European civilian 
and military capabilities;  
− facilitating a more systematic and longer term European defence cooperation, including through "pooling and sharing" 
of military capabilities; and in this regard, systematically considering cooperation from the outset in national defence 
planning by Member States;  
− facilitating synergies between bilateral, sub-regional, European and multilateral initiatives, including the EU’s "pooling 
and sharing" and NATO’s "smart defence".  
Strengthen Europe’s defence industry by  
− developing a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence technological and industrial 
base;  
− developing greater synergies between civilian and military research and development; promoting a well-functioning 
defence market, in particular through the effective implementation of the directives on public procurement and on intra-
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